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A framework for reaching 
agreement on climate change: 
morals, self-interest, and strategy 
This paper examines why negotiations following the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) 
have stalled and makes suggestions on how to 
circumvent the obstacles. In particular, the paper: 
illustrates how current barriers to international 
agreement on climate change (CC) decompose 
into the separate components-self-interest, 
morality and strategy -and discuss how the 
recent country positions are mixing them. 
discusses some elements of a conceptual 
framework that will serve as a benchmark for 
assessing the feasibility of a proposal for a CC 
agreement. 
discusses a few modest proposals that could 
potentially end the current stalemate, and also the 
potential hurdles in implementing them. 
Morals and self-interests mixed up as 
strategies: international games 
The United Nations FCCC, signed in 1992, did not 
require any binding restrictions on greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, but merely asked Annex-I 
countries to return to their 1990 emission levels by 
the year 2000. While that target is unlikely to be met 
by a majority of countries, the first Conference of 
the Parties (COP-l) felt that existing commitments 
were inadequate. The purpose of the Berlin 
Mandate of 1995 was to take action for the post- 
2000 period and strengthen the commitments of 
Annex-I countries’ by quantifying emissions 
limitations and reduction objectives, whereas the 
Developing Country Parties (DCPs) were to remain 
free from any new commitments. An Adhoc Group 
on Berlin Mandate (AGBM) was set up to negotiate 
a legal instrument before the third Conference of the 
Parties (COP-3) at Kyoto in December 1997. This 
process is essentially open to all parties. 
Negotiations amongst a large number of 
participants could be considerably complex, and it is 
feared that only a weak agreement will result by the 
deadline, postponing any effective action to a later 
date. 
The current stalemate in the global climate 
change negotiations seems to be rooted in the 
formulation of FCCC itself. The FCCC process is 
bogged down in negotiations about issues like 
emissions targets and Articles of the convention. 
Part of this due to the legalistic and political 
nature of the process. But underlying this are 
many fundamental issues: 
l countries differ in terms of their wealth, past 
and future responsibilities towards the CC 
problem, the potential CC impacts that may be 
inflicted on them, and ability to cope with 
them; 
‘In this paper we use the terms Annex-/ and North primarily to 
represent the developed countries, and the term South to 
represent the developing countries. 
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l there is uncertainty about the CC phenomenon, 
and its possible implications; and 
0 the lack of will in individual countries (in 
Annex-I of the FCCC) to achieve the assigned 
targets, which is partly due to the potentially 
high costs of actions required to attain the 
targets. 
More importantly, the FCCC seems to have ignored 
(or underplayed) the role of self-interest in the 
climate change problem. Each country looks for its 
own self-interest and it would be rather naive to 
assume otherwise. Most of the Annex-I countries, 
which were primarily expected to reduce their 
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000, may not 
be able to do so. The underlying reasons for these 
countries not adhering to the targets are the high 
costs associated, and pure self-interest. 
The FCCC has led to strategic behaviour on the 
part of countries, i.e., each country trying to bring 
every other country into its coalition. For instance, 
early on, various European countries have sought to 
take a lead in the convention, but this created 
resistance in developing countries because they 
feared that their needs or objectives were not taken 
into consideration. On the other hand, the United 
States (US) recently sought to tie its commitment to 
developing country participation by claiming that 
the South was going to be responsible for future 
emissions.2 
Many of these postures have emerged from a 
situation described in academic literature as a “two- 
level game”, in which the domestic political 
posturing of a government influences its 
international positions (Putnam, 1988). One 
common factor in many of these negative stances of 
nations, involving countries from both the South 
and the North, has been the notion that some 
sector, or the country as a whole, will lose out as a 
result of a global agreement. 
We posit that these two-level games (or behaving 
strategically for domestic interests) are hurting the 
chances of reaching international consensus, 
because domestic postures increase the pressure on 
governments not to reach unfavourable 
agreements. However, this is not to say that the 
international agreements should bypass the 
domestic interests. The international frameworks 
addressing climate change should take into 
account the possibility of such ‘self-interests’ and 
‘This logic completely ignored the fact that the North was largely 
responsible for historical emissions, and that the relative state of 
underdevelopment in the South makes it necessary to have 
resource transfers from the North to the South to fund emissions 
reduction in the South. 
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accordingly formulate guidelines. We feel that it 
may be possible to reach agreements if 
negotiations are conducted in a climate of full 
information, that is, by internationally recognizing 
the various moral grounds, self-interests and 
strategies that may be played out. In other words, 
without full information and education of all 
affected parties, the hidden strategies may 
undermine any agreement. 
At the same time, on the basis of self-interest 
alone, it also behooves the US or any other 
developed country to adopt a position that gives it 
‘win-win’ leverage, since a resulting CC agreement 
may provide its business sectors with greater 
investment opportunities in developing countries. 
For example, witness the difficulty that Enron had 
in setting up a private power plant in India (and the 
potential support an international agreement could 
have given it!), and the recent positive attitude of 
US business interests in supporting Joint 
Implementation (JI) activities. Similarly, a 
developing country also could see the CC agreement 
as a ‘win-win’ situation, because it might get the 
much required resource and technology transfers 
from the developed countries. 
We begin by developing an analytical procedure 
and illustrate it with recent pronouncements from 
the US lawmakers. The process should consist of (1) 
understanding the motivations of each strategy that 
could potentially stall the process for what it is, and 
(2) developing a positive strategy for overcoming 
such negative strategy. 
The case of the ‘summer games’ 
One clear example of strategic behaviour that could 
lead to a stalemate in the negotiations is the US 
Senate’s summer resolution on climate change. This 
has thrown a wrench into the upcoming COP-3 
convention in Kyoto. The US view is that 
developing countries will be responsible for the 
majority of emissions in the next century. Hence a 
resolution of the Senate seeks to prevent any 
protocol that “mandates new commitments to limit 
or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex 1 
parties” unless “protocol or other agreement also 
mandates new specific scheduled commitments to 
limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for 
Developing Country Parties within the same 
compliance period.. .” (US Senate, 1997). This 
position has been reinforced by a recent statement 
by President Clinton (1997). 
One way to frame this position for further analysis 
is to consider the two issues separately: (1) moral 
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grounds (including equity), and (2) self-interest. The 
US position clearly reflects both, since the US 
clearly does not wish to risk “. . . serious harm to the 
United States economy, including significant job 
loss, trade disadvantages, increased energy and 
consumer costs, or any combination thereof” (US 
Senate, 1997); that is, being the only boat that risks 
economic sinking. In short, to the US, CC should 
involve some risk to all, or none. This argument per 
se appears to be based on the moral ground that 
since climate change is a common problem for all 
countries, it should be addressed by all. 
However, this ‘self-interest’ argument (posited by the 
US as a ‘moral’ one) ignores other important moral 
issues: (1) that the North is responsible for most of the 
past emissions, which could be seen to be responsible 
for the climate change that has already been 
‘committed’; (2) that the North currently has far more 
culpability for CC on a per capita emissions basis than 
the South;3 and (3) that the South is not in a position 
to pay for current efforts to mitigate emissions, 
whereas the North is (an equity issue). 
Looking at the potential impacts of climate 
change, the slowly emerging consensus among the 
climate change impact modellers, that many 
countries in the South may actually suffer more than 
the countries in the North, adds another moral 
issue: if the North, in recognizing this, allows their 
actions to go unabated, are they not a ‘cause’ of the 
disaster that takes place? On the other hand, if 
developed countries are asking developing countries 
to participate in the ‘action’, while knowing clearly 
that the latter cannot afford to ‘act’ - given their 
development priorities and other immediate 
objectives-then they could be knowingly 
perpetuating the deadlock, or raising the potential 
gains to themselves in an eventual negotiation. 
Resolving the stalemate 
How can this stalemate be resolved? One precondition 
to resolving this is to recognize each component of the 
position for what it is: self-interest on the part of each 
country, the mix-up of moral principles with self- 
interests, and the potential gains that such strategy has 
for each country’s negotiating position. One possible 
way of overcoming domestic ‘games’ is to provide full 
information on these games to peoples in developed 
and developing countries. 
For example, since the US Senate resolution does 
‘A key feature of the Senate resolution is that it makes no reference 
to international inter-personal equity (per capita emissions, either 
in the past or in the future). It only makes a na’ive international 
comparison on how much will each country emit. 
not specify who will pay for the emission reductions 
in developing countries, and since it also apprehends 
serious harm to the US economy from 
commitments, surely it cannot be ndive in imagining 
that these are cost-free to the developing countries. 
One liberal interpretation of the US position is that 
it provides access to cheaper reduction options in 
developing countries through Joint Implementation 
(JI, otherwise known as Activities Implemented 
Jointly) or Tradable Permits (TPs), which is a more 
‘benign’ form of self-interest.4 
Seen as such, the US Senate resolution language, 
in not recognizing the other moral responsibilities, 
could also be leaving the door open for a resolution 
based on those same moral grounds. Thus, the 
debate could shift to the question of: “what can be 
done to bring developing countries into the fold, 
without risking their ability to develop?“. 
The next step will be to design a doable mechanism, 
one that is realistic and has the means to overcome 
barriers to negotiation, or that has low negotiation 
hurdles. These mechanisms could involve appealing 
to moral sentiment and various interests, particularly 
self-interest, in both the North and the South. It is 
quite likely that moral sentiment only goes so far, and 
that serious movement will only come through 
appealing to self-interest. For instance, an agreement 
might seek to include the North by involving 
commitments from the South, but also to include the 
South by tying its commitments to resource transfers 
from the North, and being contingent on reaching 
targets for economic growth rates or per capita 
income, the Human Development Index, and per 
capita emissions levels. 
Also, bringing the climate change agenda closer to 
the sustainable development agenda, which has 
objectives that are more in common with current 
development thought, could improve the feasibility 
of the mechanism. 
4A tradable emissions permit (TP) is often held up as an instrument 
that can simultaneously address two issues at the heart of CC 
negotiations-international equity and cost efficiency of 
emissions reduction. Under this scheme, each country is allotted 
TPs, which together must add up to a number no more than what 
is justilied by a tolerable level of atmospheric concentration of 
carbon dioxide. No country can emit more than the number of 
TPs held by it, net of purchases and sales. Thus. a country may 
reduce emissions at a certain cost if it can sell the TPs rendered 
surplus at remunerative prices. Likewise, a country can avoid 
incurring the high cost of emissions reduction if it can purchase 
TPs at cheaper prices. A JI scheme occurs between two countries, 
allowing one country to transfer financial, technological and 
managerial resources to another country (which has a higher 
marginal cost of reducing pollution), in exchange for a reduction 
in the emissions that the first country has to reduce. This leads to 
a more cost-effective solution for reducing aggregate solutions for 
the first country. 
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Why act now? 
We have thus far outlined the current problem and 
some basic sense for overcoming it. As noted earlier, 
the difficulty in reaching an international CC 
agreement also exists because of uncertainties and 
the perceptions of an unfair policy regime (dictated 
by domestic interests). However, this does not 
mitigate the fact that some degree of climatic change 
is inevitable, and the following reasons make it even 
more imperative that some action be taken: 
l The impacts of climatic change may be 
irreversible, so a precautionary principle 
dictates that we would be safer attempting to 
prevent it. 
l Any actions will have a delayed effect, partly 
because it takes time to ‘learn’ what might be 
the appropriate responses, be it technology or 
lifestyle adjustments (i.e. social learning). 
Furthermore, a longer planning horizon will be 
necessary to replace capital infrastructure over 
the long term. 
0 Delaying action now may result in the need for 
even stronger (and more expensive) actions in 
the future. One example of this is that the cost 
of providing foreign aid may be higher in the 
future than in the present, as a result of higher 
growth rates in developing countries relative to 
developed country growth rates, and the cost 
of turning over capital infrastructure.5 
Having discussed the current situation of CC 
negotiations, along with some of the issues that have 
been barriers to forging an agreement and reasons 
for early action, we now turn to a broader 
framework for evaluating proposals and their 
likelihood of success. 
Elements of a conceptual framework for 
evaluating proposals 
As was discussed in the previous section, there are 
many barriers to the current negotiation on CC. 
Some of them are due to the complexity of the 
climate change problem, while others are more to do 
‘The argument can be illustrated as follows: if we assume that the 
amount of ‘aid’ needed to change the GNP’s (or infrastructure’s) 
energy intensity in the future is the same as now (on a per unit 
GNP basis), and that developing countries will have higher 
growth rates than developed countries, then more aid as a 
proportion of developed countries’ GNP would be needed for 
changing the energy intensity of the future GNP of developing 
countries than is currently needed. It should be noted that this is 
a simple ‘proportions’ argument, and does not include the 
adjustment needed to turn over capital stocks that are not fully 
depreciated, nor does it take into account discount rates. 
with the FCCC process itself. One of the more 
difficult problems with the FCCC has to do with 
there being too many actors with too many 
objectives that are not being addressed.6 It was 
certainly the case in the past that developing country 
interests were not considered in processes of 
international negotiation, and even the science and 
data for climate change have been known to 
harbour a developed country bias (Roddick, 1997). 
In this section, we describe a first attempt to 
construct an evaluation framework, which can be 
used to evaluate policy proposals for the FCCC. 
The focus is on whether a given proposal is capable 
of appealing to all parties, or has the necessary 
resources to lead to an agreement. At its simplest, the 
evaluation framework would consist of a checklist 
of considerations, including the possible barriers 
that could arise within the negotiation process. At a 
more complicated level, this set of considerations 
would be developed into a fully-fledged evaluation 
framework that could be used to evaluate 
proposals.7 In this paper, we focus on only the 
simplest form of evaluation framework. 
No evaluation framework may be capable of 
forecasting exactly how well policy proposals will be 
received and the negotiating positions of countries. 
However, with some knowledge of various starting 
positions of the countries at negotiations and the 
specification of targets, it may be possible to 
forecast some possible scenarios for each policy 
proposal. In fact, the specification of a scenario may 
be valuable information for either helping to avoid 
pitfalls in the negotiation process or for preparing 
countries for the negotiation. 
Furthermore, the evaluation framework might 
have to consider some aspects of the process of 
reaching consensus within the FCCC. These include 
the aspects of social learning by various actors (e.g., 
the private sector learning how to implement JI), 
and the formation of negotiating coalitions.’ 
There have been many attempts at developing 
frameworks to explicitly achieve some purpose, such 
as legal frameworks that incorporate certain issues 
6This is even more troublesome from the point of view of 
implementation, given that the whole notion of resource transfers 
is yet to be addressed, and the expectation that the transfers for 
CC will be on a scale vastly greater than those seen in the 
Montreal Protocol. 
7Another issue is whether the FCCC itself needs to be repaired. 
For instance, it may be possible that there is simply no room for 
negotiation within the current setup of the FCCC process, 
especially because full consensus of all member states may be 
needed. However, these issues are beyond the scope of this paper. 
‘An example is the consolidation of EU member states into a 
unified position in the AGBM’s sixth session in March (United 
Nations, 1997). 
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such as equity (Brown Weiss, 1992) frameworks for 
treaty formation (Szasz, 1992) and institutional 
frameworks for environmental aid (Connolly and 
Keohane, 1996). The evaluation framework we 
propose attempts to focus more on the structure and 
constituents of the FCCC process and how they 
form the basis for the negotiation, and the policies 
for reaching a consensus. 
The issues discussed in the previous section suggest 
that an evaluation framework should account for 
aspects such as the following: 
l Actors at both the national and the sub-national 
level - sub-national level actors (e.g. special 
interest groups) should be considered because of 
the possibility of two-level games. Thus, an ideal 
policy proposal should motivate all affected 
actors, e.g. by providing benefits to as many 
actors as possible through side payments, if 
necessary and feasible. This raises issues of both 
inter- and intra-generational equity. 
l Objectives of the actors, and a means for 
evaluating the tradeoffs in objectives-in the 
broadest sense, this includes individual 
objectives (of the actors involved) as well as 
broader social objectives (e.g. the aggregate 
level of emissions reduction desired). This may 
cover the consideration of both monetary and 
non-monetary benefits and costs. 
0 Institutions for achieving the outcomes- 
institutions (such as the FCCC) represent 
forums for negotiating consensus and selecting 
policy options and, as such, are critical 
components. Furthermore, the design of 
institutions should allow for their evolution 
according to the changing relationships 
amongst actors and their strategies. 
l Implementation, transaction and negotiation 
costs- implementation costs are the direct 
costs of putting a policy into action, and 
negotiation costs may be the side payments 
needed to negotiate agreement on a policy that 
is unpopular with certain parties. Transaction 
costs include the time and effort spent on the 
negotiation itself. 
l Types of policies- the framework needs to 
provide means for the selection of the right 
policy. Many policies in the academic 
literature are unrealistic, and measures of their 
likelihood of being successfully negotiated 
should be considered. These measures include 
the implementation, transaction and 
negotiation costs. 
l Information - this includes scientific 
information, e.g., the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) process for achieving 
scientific consensus for FCCC decision support. 
In order to use the framework to evaluate a policy 
measure, it will be important to consider other issues 
which could act as integrating aspects for the 
framework. These include: 
l Institutional mechanisms- these are important 
in order to integrate diverse interests of actors 
to achieve the institution’s objectives. An 
example of one such mechanism is a legal and 
political framework that can enforce 
agreements. Getting all the actors to agree to 
enforcement is extremely difficult, given the 
variety of objectives that would exist. 
l Criteria for selecting the countries to be involved 
in the transactions -transactions in TP or .I1 
schemes may be limited to certain countries, 
particularly if they are part of an experiment. 
Emissions trading may occur between 
countries within groups or between countries 
in different groups. Selection of the trading 
partners may occur along different dimensions; 
for instance, a purely market-oriented scheme 
will dictate transactions and the transacting 
partners on the basis of price. 
l Measures for the quantities and types of 
resource transfers needed to implement 
policies - examples of these are technological 
and financial resources. Even scientific 
expertise and information is a resource that 
needs to be transferred, particularly if 
negotiations are to be ‘believed’. It will also 
be important to identify the pathways by 
which resource transfers can be carried out, 
e.g. multinational corporations and 
multilateral institutions. 
l Measures of the impacts of resource transfers 
on objectives, e.g. economic development and 
the environment- one example is that of 
foreign investment flows, which may have 
positive impacts on the environment if they 
bring in cleaner energy technology, but 
could have negative impacts if they 
continue to support the use of polluting 
technology. 
l Consideration of social learning and adaptation 
processes - for instance, different policy 
instruments and their outcomes (such as the 
development of new technologies) may have 
different time frames for taking effect or 
maturing. This may be because people require 
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time to learn, modify, and adapt to these 
technologies. 
0 Consideration of diffusive processes - these may 
involve either the expansion of the framework 
to a larger set of actors (if it starts from a 
smaller set of actors) or the diffusion of 
practices (e.g., spread of new technologies 
throughout a society). If a practice is 
economically or socially sound, it will be more 
likely to be diffused through all parts of the 
society or economy, or to have more linkages 
between more donor and recipient countries. 
A more complicated framework (than we have room 
to develop here) would have to examine how to 
combine all these components into a coherent 
process for evaluating the negotiation scenarios and 
policies. Thus, different barriers may arise; e.g., a 
strategy may be needed to accommodate the 
objectives of different actors. Some barriers would 
occur depending on the stage of the negotiation 
process. Prioritization of objectives may also need to 
be done on the part of individual countries as well 
as the institution that is trying to obtain consensus. 
Types of policies 
In order to seriously overcome the actual negotiation 
barriers, we suggest that current and future policy 
proposals be evaluated by the above framework. That 
is, each proposal should consist of not only the policy 
itself, but also the analytic means of evaluating the 
various objectives, and consideration of the various 
issues outlined above. This section examines the 
different types of policies in more detail. 
Policies can be divided into various types, including 
mitigation policies such as energy efficiency 
improvement, and adaptation policies such as 
encouraging the development of seeds that could 
adjust to new environmental conditions. Economic 
policies that have been discussed in the literature can 
be considered to be mitigation measures. Other 
policies might also be needed to support the 
implementation of an economic policy, including 
educational policies, and research and development. 
Commonly mentioned economic policies include 
government regulation, carbon taxes, TP and JI 
(which involves transfer of technical and financial 
resources). Most of the existing policy proposals 
involve either one of these types or a combination of 
more than one type. The issue of self-interest discussed 
earlier suggests that an effective policy instrument is 
one that provides benefits to all parties. Both TP and 
JI have this characteristic, and both could lead to 
greater economic (and therefore environmental) 
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efficiency from the interchange of rights (to pollute). 
Both schemes require some commitment to 
compliance from the actors involved, or an 
enforcement scheme. 
While taxes and TPs are often discussed in the 
academic literature (particularly the literature on 
economic modelling), the policy instrument that many 
consider practical within the current regime is JI. In 
fact, JI experiments are ongoing in a pilot phase that 
will extend to 2000. In the final section, we will 
examine one possible mechanism, involving a limited 
set of countries, for getting around the deadlock. 
Applying the evaluation framework 
The components of the evaluation framework 
developed above may be more complete than 
necessary to assess proposals. Indeed, one of the 
objectives was to illustrate that potential barriers 
could come from any factor or combination of 
factors. The current barriers to the FCCC were 
identified in the first section. In the next section, 
we suggest a policy proposal that overcomes some 
of the deficiencies of the FCCC and addresses 
some of the issues that have been listed in the 
checklist developed in this section. These issues 
include the selection of actors (starting with a 
limited set that may be able to reach consensus 
more easily, given the more reasonable number of 
objectives) and the selection of a policy instrument 
that provides opportunities for social learning and 
experimentation. The larger set of actors in the 
FCCC do not have much opportunity for 
experimentation unless they try pilot schemes such 
as the ongoing JI initiatives between self-selected 
partners. 
A modest proposal 
The analysis of the previous sections indicate that 
CC is dealt with optimally by considering impacts 
from emissions (a) of all types of GHGs9 (b) from 
all countries, and (c) in all time periods. This may 
not be easy to achieve, and, even as immediate 
action is urged by a variety of experts, a lot of 
valuable time could be consumed in reaching a 
consensus over what actions individual countries 
should take. Compromise from all quarters will be 
necessary if timely action is to be taken. In this 
section, we examine a current proposal and put 
forward another for a future course of actions to 
“Apart from carbon dioxide, which is well known and has received 
wider attention by far, other GHGs are methane, nitrous oxide and 
CFCs. 
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halt CC, which draw on insights gained from the 
conceptual framework described previously. The 
proposal we examine first is JI, which has been 
introduced earlier in the previous section as a cost- 
effective mechanism for reducing carbon emissions 
globally. Then we discuss our proposal for 
restructuring the global CC negotiations in such a 
way that congregates key players into an exclusive 
club, which will allocate emission rights and 
reduction responsibilities amongst these members. 
Once this is done, club membership can be opened 
to the remaining countries, provided they accept 
the rights and responsibilities allocated to them, 
which will take care of their economic status and 
vulnerability to CC. 
Joint Implementation-A Way Ahead 
The key players in JI are (a) the governments of 
Annex-I countries, (b) firms in Annex-I countries, 
(c) governments of countries hosting JI projects, (d) 
JI project collaborators in host countries, (e) the 
agency for certifying emissions reduction achieved 
through a JI project. It will be necessary to 
understand their perceptions of JI, their incentives 
to participate in JI projects and how they will 
actually act in one. Business firms will primarily be 
concerned about their profits. Unless required by 
regulation, or facing appropriate economic 
incentives, they will not participate in a JI project on 
their own. Annex-I governments will be primarily 
responsible for the behaviour of business firms in 
their countries while host country governments will 
need to guard their development priorities. Host 
country firms that collaborate in JI projects can gain 
from access to better technology and management 
practices which may be useful for their business. In 
the end, it falls to the lot of an accredited 
international agency to certify that JI projects are 
able to reduce global emissions. 
JI projects evidently reduce the cost to Annex-I 
countries of meeting their emissions reduction 
obligation besides creating new business 
opportunities for them. That apart, it may bring 
substantial benefits to the host country as well: 
l Technology transfers during a JI project may 
lead to spillover benefits for human capital in 
the host country. 
l It may also spur FDI. 
0 It may promote sustainable development 
practices. 
A number of thorny issues are involved while 
designing Jl projects between an Annex-I country 
and a DCP, which are typically the most attractive 
partners. Among them are: 
To verify emissions reductions in the country 
hosting a JI project, a suitable baseline has to be 
established but it may prove difficult to agree 
on one. A host country could wilfully 
misrepresent its baseline emissions to gain a 
bargaining advantage. A baseline should ideally 
play the same role for a DCP as a binding target 
set for an Annex-I country; i.e., a DCP should 
be able to commit itself credibly to a baseline. 
While emissions reduction can be verified on a 
project-by-project basis using agreed baselines, 
it will be difficult to verify that emissions will 
not increase elsewhere-in some other sector, 
country, or time period, or in the form of 
some other greenhouse gas? Thus, certifying 
agencies will need some methods to deal with 
emission leakages. 
Some JI projects may be inherently risky and 
the bilateral partners will have to decide on 
how the risk will be shared between them. 
Emissions reduction from a JI project between two 
Annex-I countries need not be monitored on a 
project-by-project basis. It is enough to verify 
that the two countries have emitted within their 
targets net of JI credits transferred between them. 
It may be noted that the TP scheme is a logical 
extension of JI, when there are many buyers and 
sellers of JI projects, and is theoretically a more 
cost-effective way of reducing emissions. Given 
widespread misgivings about market processes, 
especially in the DCPs, Jl may serve well as a 
stepping stone for an eventual transition to a 
global TP system.” The problem of crediting 
emissions reduction of JI projects is analogous to 
that faced in a TP scheme of constructing acurate 
inventories of emissions by each source in each 
country and then matching them against the 
number of TPs held by that country. An 
interesting possibility is that credits earned 
through JI may be permitted for eventual trading. 
Climate Change Action Club 
Currently, the views amongst the Annex-I countries 
“However, it is not clear whether transaction costs (of ‘searching’, 
‘negotiating’ and ‘consummating’ deal) are lower in JI than in 
exchanging TPs. ‘Searching’ in an international market, which is 
larger, may fetch better deals, which yield higher costs savings, 
than entering into bilateral deals, so TPs should be more efficient 
than JI. On the other hand, if a country begins to look around for 
the best bilateral deal then, of course, it should count the cost of 
searching for one. 
387 
A framework for reaching agreement on climate change: F T Tschang et al. 
are divergent. On the one hand, the US, which has a 
share of about 20% in current global emissions of 
carbon dioxide, was apparently uncommitted to any 
action on restricting emissions in the post-2000 
period if the DCPs remain free of any commitments 
to restrict emissions in the same period. On the 
other hand, the European Union (EU) advocates 
reducing emissions by up to 20% of the 1990 levels 
by 2010 without asking DCPs to join in”. Amongst 
the Annex-I countries, the issue of differentiated 
responsibilities is not yet resolved. 
It is a common management practice to solve 
problems through an ‘ABC’ analysis, which 
identifies the top contributors to a problem and then 
focuses attention on them. CC is an international 
problem and a good way to tackle it is to evolve a 
consensus between the key players on what actions 
should be taken. Thus, nations with the highest 
GHG emissions currently and in the future should 
be included, and nations which will suffer the 
highest impact of CC (e.g., those in the Association 
of Small Island States) should also find 
representation. Due recognition should also be given 
to hegemonic powers, winning and blocking 
coalitions.‘2 The objective of this club should be to 
allocate emission rights and reduction 
responsibilities amongst the initial members in a way 
that leads to a significant slowing down of emissions 
accumulation. 
A number of factors would help bind the club 
members together: (a) interests of individual 
member countries are mutually protected; (b) 
mutual business and trade opportunities (say, in the 
field of energy technologies during the process of JI) 
may be given preferential treatment. In this sense, 
the formation of the club mimics the establishment 
of a strategic treaty (like the NATO) or a trade bloc 
(like the APEC), etc., except that its chief objective 
is to reduce the risk of CC. 
An agreement between a few selected countries is 
obviously incomplete from a global viewpoint. 
“These positions are being revised with the COP3 negotiations. 
“Some of these criteria for selecting key players, though given in a 
limited context of modelling global CC negotiations, are discussed 
in Ringius (1997). 
13For example, an analysis of the “profitability and stability of 
international agreements to protect the environment in the 
presence of trans-frontier or global pollution” is to be found in 
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993). “Each country decides whether or 
not to coordinate its strategy with other countries. A coalition is 
formed when conditions of profitability and stability (no free- 
riding) are satisfied.” They show that “such coalitions exist; that 
they tend to involve a fraction of negotiating countries; and that 
the number of signatory countries can be increased by means of 
self-tinanced transfers. However, expanding coalitions requires 
some form of commitment. Such schemes of commitment and 
transfers can even lead to cooperation by all countries.” 
There will be problems of emissions leakages as 
non-members will free-ride. But there appears to be 
some support in the economics literature for the 
idea that international environmental problems 
could be effectively tackled by working with a 
coalition of concerned countries.‘” The agreement 
need not be static. Once the proposed club is seen as 
an effective organization whose membership confers 
not only privileges such as preferential access to 
protection against natural disasters (possibly related 
to unmitigated CC) or preferential rights to business 
and trade opportunities, but also imposes 
responsibilities such as agreeing to participate in 
international action for reducing emissions, 
additional members may be willing to join. 
Sub-optimal solutions may be expected from such 
a club: potential members may wait for the club to 
declare higher benefits from membership. The club 
may reciprocate by not taking hard enough 
measures to combat CC and suggest soft solutions 
that maximize the benefits for current and potential 
members. Such strategizing, if it happens, will 
obviously be unsuited for confronting the basic 
issues of CC. The club formation in the first 
instance should ensure gains for each member; i.e., it 
should be a stable coalition of the initial partners. 
The club should not bend the framework to admit 
additional members. If new members do not come 
in, then global benefits will be sub-optimal but may 
not be below zero. Non-members will free-ride but 
presumably they will face some costs of exclusion 
from the club. Therefore, it is essential that the 
original mandate of the club, which is to halt CC, 
not be compromised at any stage of expansion of its 
membership. 
On a final note, it is not clear how a club like the 
one described above could function given the 
existing institutional structure of FCCC. Moreover, 
if such a coalition develops outside the existing 
framework for negotiations, then how should the 
UN respond to such moves? The UN functions 
largely as an all-inclusive organization except for 
one organ, its Security Council, which has a more 
exclusive character and is perhaps more effective in 
terms of actions. Perhaps it is time to think of an 
Environmental Security Council? 
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